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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses why theology has to develop a concern with 
economy and economics and elaborates a perspective for a new 
debate between theologians and economists about socio-ethical 
problems in public life. The hermeneutically reflected 
relationship between church and economic life has been 
elaborated in a number of principles of community development. 
Church and economy are seen as two important 'horizons of 
human life'. Economic developments, symptoms of crisis and 
symptoms of stagnation are mainly present in the Church's social 
teaching owing to the fact that faith communities and their 
leaders are confronted with these social problems. This paper 
approaches the relationship between the two horizons in a 
perspective of public theology. An open conversation between 
theology and economics focuses on a new praxis-led theology. 
Whenever the meaning of 'the good life' is attached to the 
realisation of functions and capacities in the concrete markets 
within an actual economy, the actuality of the economic reality is 
placed within a horizon that expresses a sense of that life. It then 
becomes possible to state that a concrete set of functions and 
capacities are in service to humanity.
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 By Way of Introduction
hristian theology in our time arises from a renewed reflection on 
Cthe missionary activity of christian faith communities. But as faith 
communities spread all over the world only exist in plural and are 
landmarked by a variety of societal and cultural contexts, the missionary 
activity of Christian faith communities has to be contextualised as well. 
Asian bishop-conferences are confronted in this respect with a series of 
challenges quite different from challenges European bishop-conferences 
have to deal with. Being a Christian community in a society that is 
characterised by an important 'middle class' requires a conceptualising and 
strategic 'mission' that is by no means useful and authentic when a society is 
divided by a clash between a small minority of very wealthy people and a 
huge mass of (extremely) poor people. The classic dictum ecclesia semper 
reformanda has to be contextualised in such a way that the 'catholic' 
principle in the Christian confession of faith has to be understood as a 
horizon, rather than as a point of departure of theological reflection about 
the reality of the church. The church will become catholic (that is her 
mission) only by contextualised programmes of reformation. 
This ecclesiological point of view actually is confronted with a 
historical reality that asks for analysis of the many influences of a 
globalising economy on specific societal and cultural phenomena. 
Economic globalisation has by no means to be understood as an all and 
everything devouring 'monster', although many theologians in the first and 
third world do so. In a way, this is a reaction on economic globalisation that 
emerges from their passionate concern for human communities and 
cultures that suffer from many inhuman effects of economic globalisation. 
But, in my opinion, the passionate concern for the humanity of human 
beings (a core principle of Christian faith communities) urges to think 
global and to act local also in this respect. Resistance (by theologians and 
lC l l l
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church leaders) against violence and devastation of  human communities 
requires a theological analysis of economic and social parameters of what 
happens historically in given communities. Programmes of reformation 
(see above) can be contextualised only in this way.
The following sentences of my late colleague Prof. Beemer are therefore 
of great importance. In his farewell address (Nijmegen, 6 Nov 1992) he 
stated: 'There is no such thing as pure theology; the inclusion of a non-
theological but historically conscious social theory, and any sociological 
research emanating from it (such as research on processes of 
impoverishment), is essential in learning to recognize the human 
inclination towards God and the aversion from God in our history.' His 
field was 'moral theology'. He explained – using words of Thomas Aquinas 
– theology being a scientific reflection on 'the human inclination towards 
God and the aversion from God in our history'. He explained moral 
theology – in Aquinas' approach as well - being a reflection how human life 
can be recognised as inclined towards and / or aversed from the telos of 
human life.
This paper will elaborate some perspectives on community building 
being an essential dimension of programmes of reformation as mentioned 
above. There are three sections. The first section is about the concept of 
church. The second section deals with the concept of economy. The final 
section will explore a concept of community development in the 
perspective of public theology.
Church as a Horizon of Human Life
Ever since the 19th century – 'the great era of the Church' as the famous 
French theologian Yves Congar o.p. has put it -  ecclesiology is a distinct 
part of theological research and reflection.  The 19th century was the era of 
an enormous missionary expansion of Christian churches and  – as we 
recognise now – the era of an enormous expansion of eurocentrism, in 
ecclesiology as well. All kind of ecclesial institutions, architecture and 
ecclesial movements have been spread all over the world by Christian 
missionaries who were organised in mostly hierarchical structures based in 
Europe. Many of these missionaries have understood their work being part 
of a programme of plantatio ecclesiae. According to them, the substance of 
the church was there already, but needed to be spread as widely as possible. 
So, they have developed all kind of copies of originally European ideas, 
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habits, attitudes and so on in the so-called mission-territories. And they 
have done it in a passionate understanding of their Christian calling to 
submit their whole life to the message of the Gospel.
Perhaps, already during the 50s and 60s of the 20th century, many of 
these missionaries became aware that they themselves not only changed by 
their work in a social and cultural context in e.g. Asia or Africa as their 
spirituality and lifestyle deeply changed through their commitment to the 
other people whom they take care of. Many of them have understood that 
architecture, liturgy, movements and so on had to change as well. And 
whenever the official churches in their policies and structures have made 
room for that,  church institutions changed as well. In the Anglican church, 
monastic life forms came up for communities build up with Indian people. 
Same goes for some communites in the originally Protestant churches  in 
e.g. the Church of North India. Traditional Catholic ideas about formation 
of a new generation of priests and brothers changed in Indonesia. Even the 
question whether priestly-ministry requires celibacy became a question of 
debate, e.g. in Africa.
These questions about institutional 'configuration' of Christian 
church-life have made clear that the horizon of missionary thinking and 
acting was moving, and it still moves. Everyone in Christian churches is 
nowadays aware of the great conflicts these questions have caused. And 
actually these tensions between changing spiritualities and more or less 
fixed institutions continue to raise big conflicts in the Christian churches. 
Anyone who  likes to reduce these conflicts to matters of loyalty (loyalty to 
your own culture versus loyalty to the church), refuses to recognise that 
changing spirituality includes a renewed awareness of how church can be 
perceived and understood being a horizon of real human life. In my 
opinion, programmes of contextualised reformation (see above) can only 
be developed when these tensions between spirituality and institutions are 
taken into account.
I am writing here about fundamental questions of pastoral strategy. But 
I am writing about fundamental theological questions as well. I like to pay 
attention to the theological dimension of these questions. The German 
reformed theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer  has – in his famous 'Letters from 
prison' (Gefängnisbriefe) – explained that the human inclination towards 
God (as Beemer has put it many years after Bonhoeffer was killed by the 
Nazi's in 1944) does not imply something additional to what human social 
and cultural activity is about. According to Bonhoeffer, we have – being in 
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the Church – just to act accordingly the parameters of the public life in our 
society. He coined this approach of being a Christian in your society a 'non-
religious' way of being as you don't have to draw up a way of acting that – 
like a surplus–should add something to real life, something that should be 
essential and more important than human life itself. According to 
Bonhoeffer, the non-religious character of spirituality, of institutions, of 
thinking, of building up a community, do not contradict the human 
inclination towards God and is not per se an example of aversion from 
God. The inclination towards God is named (by Bonhoeffer) a 'discplina 
arcani'. There is an inner mystery in our public and personal life being 
human beings. Incarnational faith does not imply an additional dimension 
of our humanly living in our own world. Another famous (Catholic) 
theologian, M-D. Chenu, OP. used to refer to a line of Thomas Aquinas 
stating gratia non suppleat naturam sed perficit. The grace of God does not 
replace our human reality but brings it to its own telos.
Thinking about the Church as a horizon of human life, we can refer to 
the concepts of  the World Council of Churches. The WCC has 
summarized this horizon by speaking about 'a mission for a peaceful, just 
and sustainable society'. These words imply that theology focuses on social 
questions and the direct political implications of economic choices. The 
theological contribution to programmes supporting these goals is mainly 
seen in the urgency to make the Gospel's message comprehensible in 
discussions with the 'handiwork of practical economics'. A first task for 
theologians– in this respect – is critically stripped off the 'idolatrous' forms 
of their own interpretations of Christian traditions and Church policies in 
the name of belief in God. Not every public claim about peace, justice and 
sustainability, being proposed in the field of politics or the church,  has to 
be assessed fruitful.  Especially the dimension of organization of power (e.g. 
corruption and casteism) in the many ways social and political targets are 
being brought forward in public life and in the church ask for a continuous 
criticism, also by theologians.  But from a socio-ethical point of view, there is 
a second task to be discerned. The problem centres on the question how (in 
the socio-economic life) the dignity of the human person, his total calling 
and the well-being of all of society is to be respected and advanced. The 
Church sees the advancement of the dignity of the human person as a 
central aspect of its missionary activity. The German  theologian and 
ethicist Arno Anzenbacher sees the socio-ethical aspect of the problem in 
the question how the notion of the human person as it is expressed here 
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should be related to the concept of subject that is present in the market 
economy system. Anzenbacher defines the subject in the market economy 
system as the person who assumes the role in the market of entrepreneur, 
capitalist, employee or consumer.
 Economy as a Horizon of Human Life
Arno Anzenbacher speaks about the market-economical concept of 
modern man that is characterised by an autonomous system steered more 
or less 'automatically' by rational preferences of the homo oeconomicus. This 
asks for some explanation of the background of  this concept (homo 
oeconomicus). As in predominant (i.e. the so-called neo-classical) thinking 
of economics is no room for the concept of telos of human life, all debate 
between theologians and economists about socio-ethical problems in 
public life seems to be useless. Therefore this section will reconstruct some 
elements of this argument.
th
The 18  century has brought, after a period of politics related 
mercantilism, the emergence of a new branch of independent science: the 
economics. The emergence of this  science goes along with the domination 
of utilitarian philosophy, in spite of a totally different approach of the 
relation of economics and ethics in the seminal work of one of the 
founding fathers, Adam Smith. His oeuvre knows two famous works, The 
Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments. They are to be 
interpreted as a 'twin'. In this work on modern economy and its actors, 
economics and ethics are deeply related.
Fifty years after Smith, economics got connected with utilitarianism (in 
Jeremy Bentham's work). Nowadays, from a utilitarian point of view only 
the sum or average of individual welfare matters. Utilitarianism is a form of 
consequentialist ethical theory. Actions, rules or policies are morally 
permissable if and only if there is no alternative with better consequences. 
One important good in many of these theories is the satisfaction of needs, 
though not as a fundamental or intrinsic good but taken as an informed 
preference. In standard theory, these preferences are derived from choices. 
So preferences are conceived of as subjective states that lead to actions. 
Compared to the Aristotelian-Thomistic conceptions of good and 
common good, this conception of preferences reveals an enormous gap. 
According to classical approaches, agents have to ask themselves what they 
should do if they live or act well. They do not stress the intentional 
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dimension of human actions and decisions but their object, their end. In 
standard economic theory, the analysis is not directed towards ends but 
towards decisions, towards doing what one most prefers to do. The analysis 
of behaviour is directed towards maximizing the ability to rank x and y. 
And as the economics emerged in societies which were strongly 
influenced by Calvinism and its suspicion of earthly authority in both 
church and state, the traditional Catholic approach of common good had 
to meet criticism from economists' stress on intelligent pursuit of private 
gain. Schumpeter states: '…whether as cause or consequence, this 
[utilitarian] philosophy expresses only too well the spirit of social 
irresponsibility which characterised the passion and the secular or rather 
secularized state of the nineteenth century. And in the midst of moral 
confusion, economic success serves only to render still more serious the 
social and political situation which is the natural result of a century of 
1
economic liberalism'.
To understand why Schumpeter can indicate this as a result of a century 
of economic liberalism, one has to realise why utilitarian philosophy goes 
along with (neo-)classical definitions of economics. In the perspective of 
Lionel Robbins' famous definition, economics is not concerned with a 
particular class of social phenomena (production, distribution, exchange, 
and consumption of goods and services) but with a particular aspect of the 
human behaviour concerning this class of phenomena: how to behave 
rationally in situations when goods and services are scarce and have 
alternative uses. Although Robbins' definition of economics is not 
unquestioned, it has marked an approach of economic science that has been 
oriented to the aggregation of utilities, being goods and services that are 
satisfactory for the needs of an individual actor. Here we are far away from 
the classical teleological approach of the common good and the 
antropology connected with it. The toolkit of an economist (Schumpeter) 
that allows to make descriptive judgments and analytical assessments of 
economic processes and results within a framework of end-means 
rationality, does not fit in these kind of questions, let alone the reference to 
a supernatural x-factor. As Schumpeter has stated: although nearly every 
economist starts the research from an ideological bias, e.g. about the 
Common Good,  which (s)he ex hypothesi is not aware of  in the scientific 
rationalisations, the scientific work of the economics is directed on 
assumptions or propositions (theorems) that are developed in a procedure 
that makes models, carries out tests, is controlled by logic, induces 
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statistical data. 'The stock of facts and tools rejuvenates itself in the process', 
but a 'prescientific cognitive act which is the source of our ideologies is also 
2
the prerequisite of our scientific work'.  Although, like mentioned, Knight 
stressed that economics is about individual behaviour that reveals 
individual preferences, he pointed out that economics, although growing 
up in an atmosphere that in the name of liberty of economic agents was 
directed against control, 'society cannot accept individual ends and 
individual means as data or as the main objectives of economic policy'. 'The 
actual interest or desires expressed in economic behaviour … cannot be 
described apart from a system of social relations which itself cannot be 
3
treated in purely  objective, factual terms'.  He states that 'this almost 
exclusive interest in classical economics on liberation from a antiquated 
system of control' has raised a problem because 'the current standards of 
thinking have come under the extreme domination of the scientific ideal 
which has little if any applicability to the problem. The ultimate 
foundation of a group unity must be of the nature of morale and sentiment 
rather than knowledge. There is no intellectual solution of conflicts of 
interests' (idem,117). Normative discussions (e.g. political economy) are 
rejected as unscientific. As Schumpeter has put it: they are important 
although they are a prescientific prerequisite of the scientific work of 
economics.Especially in the framework of welfare economics, this 
distinction has become a decisive landmark of economic science. In the 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being, a rational and so: scientific 
analysis is possible if and only if people who are in similar circumstances, 
should be regarded as similarly well-off. The famous Pareto optimum (a 
state of affairs in which it is impossible to make anyone better off without 
making someone worse off) is the definition of a state of 'minimal 
benevolence' (Hausmann&McPherson, 261), implying that, other things 
being equal, it is a morally good thing if people are better off. 'It shows how 
completely economists identify well-being with the satisfaction of 
preferences' (id.). Most economists are triggered by this – finally utilitarian 
– principle because they define it as the only rational way to do. Otherwise, 
they should get involved in political and moral, controversial matters that 
should preclude scientific research in economics. Well-being seems to be 
just a part of the standard view of rationality and includes the theoretical 
defense of perfect competition, other things being equal (id. 262.263). 
Although the standard view makes possible for economists to give 
'purely technical advice' in many cases that are politically or morally 
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controversial, and although many economists think their science has 
anything to gain from ethics, this standard view is not that 'neutral' as is 
supposed. The 'minimal benevolence' is not that benevolent as suggested by 
this standard view. In the wake of the neo-liberal approach of economics, 
there always have been debates (so: doubts) about its core suppositions. Two 
types of debates require to look for alternatives.
The first type to be mentioned here is the (above mentioned) debate 
about 'interpersonal comparisons of utility'. In standard economics, 
everybody is believed to be equipped with a preference ordering in choosing 
commodity bundles. Everybody is believed too to be equipped with all 
relevant information (well-informed) and capacities to make a choice 
among these possible bundles from an index of preferences that an agent is 
entitled to handle freely and independently. But these suppositions are not 
always realistic. Information is curtailed by all kinds of reasons, possible 
preferences are restricted by law or institutions, individuals are deprived of 
knowledge and assess outcomes in a framework that is restrained by cultural 
traditions. There are many reasons to reckon not only with 'bounded 
rationality' but also with a non-utilitarian approach of economic agency. 
New research in economics makes clear that the traditional separation of 
positive economics and normative economics is not adequate enough to 
analyse how interpersonal comparisons of utility have to be understood. 
The standard view within which economic rationality and a utilitarian 
approach of well-being are deeply interwoven, has to be reviewed.
The second type of debates about the standard view is a debate about the 
definition and analysis of poverty. This debate arises during the last decades 
th
of the 20  century. 'The stranglehold of normative utility-based economics 
4
has been challenged'.  Within micro-economics, there has been a lot of 
research about income-inequality. Shift in the age composition of males, 
increase in service-oriented work, changes in the labor-force participation 
of women, changes in skills caused by technology, changes in demografics, 
are some of the many reasons why traditional income-strata get tangled up. 
'Most researchers sought to examine the quantitative impacts of changes in 
5
(un)employment and its important redistributive effects'.  'Because public 
policy makers agree that poverty is a disease that needs to be eradicated, it is 
very important how we properly quantify poverty measurement and how 
we do interpret change in any given measure we select to quantify it' (id.). 
From a macroeconomic perspective, this kind of welfare theory has been 
criticised because it does not pay enough attention to rights and freedoms. 
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According to the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, the conventional practice to 
represent values in terms of individual utility has to be criticised. He has 
introduced the concept of a person's capabilities or functionings, 'parts of 
the state of a person, on particular the various things that he or she manages  
6
to do or be in leading a life'.  According to Sen, what really matters is the 
degree to which a person can freely choose alternative combinations of 
functions. Sen holds a plea for an egalitarian approach of this freedom. 
Although Sen's approach has brought to the floor the fundamental 
question about the very nature of freedom, critics state that his capability 
egalitarianism just pays attention to a broadened concept of liberalism. 
Today, many economists have fundamental questions about the character 
of rationality that tacitly is interwoven in welfare economics. Some state 
that rational choice theory does account for values in economic behaviour, 
only it does so in an unsatisfactory way. But others look for a 
fundamentally other approach of rationality because people in daily life 
seem to make choices in an evaluation process that is much more 
complicated than end-means rationality suggests. Even the so-called 
bounded rationality is a figure of instrumental and procedural rationality, 
they say, and empirical research raises questions of how to understand  
people's choices in markets as a result of persuasive discourse regarding 
values. Far beyond the subjectification and individualization of value 
introduced by marginalists like Menger and Marshall, critics of this 
formalist approaches of rationality state that values are to be found in the 
interactions between people, are culturally transmitted and embedded in 
traditions, institutions and customs. These critics want to turn the attention 
of economics from onesided attention to 'what kind of bundles of 
preferences make me, individual actor, happy' towards 'how are the agents 
bundles of preferences embedded in traditional, societal, cultural 
(including: religious) representations of happiness'. That is a reason to pay 
renewed attention to the age-old aristotelian concept of (common) good 
being the telos of human life.
Another reason to do so, refers to the globalization. Welfare economics 
has inevitably been contextualized in the unprecedented globalization of 
cultures, societies and markets. The obviously ongoing and not 
diminishing problems of poverty, economic dependency and socio-
religious clashes of civilizations bring new questions about the common 
good to the fore. These questions raise a new consciousness about and a new 
concept of political economy that engenders a normative framework that 
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transcends the reality of nation-states, encompasses local dynamics of 
economic freedom as well as intra-local dynamics of governance that orient 
conflicts of economic agents.
The right to welfare hinges ultimately on the value accorded to 
individual autonomy. Important question therefore is to reconsider this 
concept of autonomy. Some authors develop an 'economics for the 
common good', being a fundamental economical theory that states that on 
the basis of all concepts of welfare there is a universal norm, called human 
7
dignity.  Its basic argument is that choices to pursue an action are acts of 
attribution of value or worth that is valuable, so the person him/herself 
must be the source of that value. Human dignity is a purpose of agents who 
must equally extend this value or worth to all other agents. This concept of 
agency is not based on pains and pleasures of solipsist individuals whose 
freedom is fundamentally endless although bounded by a lot of reasons and 
rules. 'This concept of agency implies the ability to control one's behaviour 
to choose what appears as really desirable and not just to follow one's 
inclinations or strongest desire', as the philosopher Gewirth states (quoted 
by Lutz; id., 135).
This approach wants to introduce a renewed concept of normative 
economics. Instead of being based on a principle of 'minimal benevolence', 
it is based on two principles. First: value or worth is to be attributed to all 
persons equally. Second: the norm of equal human dignity is rationally 
grounded, and therefore this equally attributed value or worth is a rightful 
claim to be treated in accordance with this claim.
This section has started by referring to the predominant thinking of 
economists which do not acknowledge any room for the concept of telos of 
human life. The section shows that there are  new approaches in economics 
that put new questions  about the neo-classical points of departure, 
summarized in the model of the homo oeconomicus.  Actually, a whole branch 
of modern economists rephrases the fundamental questions of their science 
and make room for a new debate between theologians and economists 
about socio-ethical problems in public life.
Towards an Approach of Community Development from a Perspective 
of Public Theology
The dialogue between theology and economics on the reality of the 
economy is important. The dialogue on the reality of the economy is not 
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simply a specific application of a generic notion of the mission of the 
Church. Rather the faith community will encounter its own mission in 
actual economic reality and through the conflicts present in it, as the text of 
Gaudium et Spes of Vatican II has put it. The Church's social teaching has to 
do with a wide range of social conflicts; it addresses a series of social and 
economic problems, including the question of the actual content of the 
Church's mission. It has to do with social injustice in the labour market, 
issues about the humanisation of labour, issues about the mechanism of the 
labour market and about the mechanism of organised labour. Economic 
developments, symptoms of crisis and symptoms of stagnation are mainly 
present in the Church's social teaching owing to the fact that faith 
communities and their leaders are confronted with these social problems. 
In this arena, the discussion of economic reality is introduced via social 
problems.
This paper approaches the relationship between the two horizons in a 
perspective of public theology. An open conversation between theology and 
economics focuses on a new praxis-led theology. I agree with Tracy that a 
8
public theology has to be public as it is theocentric.  He argues that 
theologians are not involved in public theological discourse unless they 
reflect deliberately and critically upon God, as their public reflections about 
the affirmations of God are their main task. Therefore a public theology has 
to deal with all sort of secular traditions of thought and their truth-claims. 
'Theology can be said to be public insofar as it conveys a meaningful and 
true disclosure of something that is most relevant for human life in the 
9
current circumstance of society'.  A public theology wants to relate critically 
the specific, particular traditions of Christianity and 'the whirlpool of 
10
Postmodernity'.
How does this affect the character of the publicness of theology? Tracy 
stresses the importance of Walter Benjamin's interest for fragments of 
infinity and sacred hope and for those people who are forgotten in 
modernity's historical developments. The people who do not partipate in 
the logos of the processes of rationalization in the actual world, are bearers of 
the plain sense of the passion narrative that displays the focal point of all 
adequately Christian understanding of God. In Tracy's view, their lives are 
signifiers of the hidden presence of God. He draws upon Hans Frei's work 
11
on Christian narratives in this respect.
So, the publicness of theology is not related any longer to a language of 
full presence of meaning in conscious thought. Neither is the publicness of 
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theology related to a concept of pure identity (in theisms, ego-ism or other -
ism), nor to a concept of clear and distinct self-presence. The publicness of 
theology is related to and founded in the people who do not represent 
12
presence at all. This is the core of Christian God-talk.
I conclude that a public theology can be developed without assuming an 
onto-theological point of departure. There is a path for a theocentric 
theology that leaves behind this foundationalism and that is critical 
towards theological truth-claims that claim immunity of criticism. This 
public theology is open to a dynamically expansive, recursively critical view 
13
of human rationality.  Therefore, this conception of rationality is suitable 
for a conversation with economics within which theology refers to its core 
in a way that is not normative in a foundationalist way. Instead, this strand 
of publicness of theology reveals its God-focus. In a conversation about 
purposeful behavior, directed by questions about values giving meaning to 
human life, theology stresses the values of fragments of infinity and sacred 
hope, and the values represented by those people who are forgotten in 
modernity's historical developments.
A fundamental question is how the words 'market' and 'privatisation' 
should be understood. Here visions of society collide and there is evidence 
of a power struggle. In the arena of society, the discussion has to do with 
how we are to impart meaning to the notion of the 'bonum commune' in 
terms of market forces, how we are to define it and under what systematic 
conditions can we make this issue more approachable.
Expressed in more ethical terms, this means that the idea of the 
eudaimonia (the bonum commune) is related, reciprocally and critically, to the 
scope of useful functions and capacities. Only specific useful functions and 
capacities can give meaning to the notion of 'the good life'. The content of 
this category can only be formulated with the help of actual time- and 
culture-specific possibilities for leading a humane life. This particularity 
means that the ideal of 'the good life' is constantly changing. But whenever 
the meaning of 'the good life' is attached to the realisation of functions and 
capacities in the concrete markets within an actual economy, the actuality 
of the economic reality is placed within a horizon that expresses a sense of 
that life. Designating this set of functions and capacities as 'the good life' 
suggests a coherence-creating correlation is contained within it that comes 
to the fore. It becomes possible to state that a concrete set of functions and 
capacities are in service to humanity. 
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In imagining humanity as horizon, religious traditions also occupy a 
meaningful place. Theologian Ignacio Ellucuría has clearly explained that a 
religious tradition has a utopian potential that is essential if we are to 
continue approaching any prevailing image of the bonum commune 
critically. Without the 'qualification' with regard to the bonum commune that 
issues from a religious utopia, its universal purpose threatens to become 
ideological. Ignacio Ellucuría explains that a religious utopia is the very 
thing that incites people to confront an idea of the commune bonum with 
fundamental human rights.  In the social thinking of the Catholic Church, 
human dignity takes primacy over individual freedom of choice and 
autonomy [...] the deepest value of being human is ultimately not derived 
from the right to or power of self-determination [...] but the value of the 
human life as such is seen as inviolable. This goes much further than the 
Kantian approach of human dignity, which is often the determining factor 
in discussions on human rights, according to Ellacuría.
The horizon of public theology proposed here can finally been 
expressed with a category of Beemer: he describes the subject-matter of all 
theology, so: including community-development, as the birthright of the 
destitute,  it's about the essential vocation of the human individual. This is 
where the birthright derives its claim to universality.
When we try to specify the consequences of these points of departure in 
programmes of community development, the next reflexions are useful. 
Community development has first and for all to be understood within the 
Church' mission for diakonia. When diakonia has to understood as a way to 
community development, diakonia is no longer about private supporting 
of people but has to be defined as a programme of bringing people together 
in a mutual acknowledgment of each other's capacities (Sen). 
1. These programmes have to be focused on imagination. They have to 
be focused on imagination of our daily life being  the context ánd 
content of our imagined practises and attitudes and ideas about 'a good 
life'. 
2. These programmes have to be focused on mutual sharing the 
imagination of 'a good life' in a way that criticism of what obstruses it is 
part of it. Only by critically sharing the imagination of 'a good life', 
people will become actors of their own freedom.
3. These programmes have to be focused on sharing the imagination 
of 'a good life' in a way that praying adresses their common faith being 
the horizon of human life. Only by sharing their praying, people will 
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become actors of their own history with God. 
4. These programmes have to be focused on mutual sharing not only 
the challenges of 'a good life' but sharing the unavoidable and inevitable 
evil as well. Only by mutually sharing the confrontation with evil, 
people will become human beings that are able to support the 
ambiguities and ambivalences in their imagined history with each other 
and with God. 
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